Android ransomware trends and case studies: A reverse engineering approach by Xu, Chenliang
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations 
2019 
Android ransomware trends and case studies: A reverse 
engineering approach 
Chenliang Xu 
Iowa State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Xu, Chenliang, "Android ransomware trends and case studies: A reverse engineering approach" (2019). 
Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 17810. 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/17810 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and 
Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and 
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, 
please contact digirep@iastate.edu. 







A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
MASTER OF SCIENCE  
 
Major: Computer Engineering 
 
Program of Study Committee: 








The student author, whose presentation of the scholarship herein was approved by the 
program of study committee, is solely responsible for the content of this thesis. The 
Graduate College will ensure this thesis is globally accessible and will not permit 















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................................ iii 
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................................... iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................................... v 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................... vi 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORKS ................................................................................................................. 4 
Android Defender ....................................................................................................................................... 4 
Simplocker .................................................................................................................................................. 4 
WannaCry ................................................................................................................................................... 5 
CHAPTER 3. TAXONOMY ........................................................................................................................... 7 
Types of Android Ransomware .................................................................................................................. 7 
Trend of Android Ransomware ................................................................................................................... 7 
Techniques of Lock-screen Ransomware ................................................................................................... 8 
Unlocking Techniques ................................................................................................................................ 9 
Password Generate Techniques ................................................................................................................ 10 
CHAPTER 4. CASE ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................. 11 
A. SB Modifier .......................................................................................................................................... 11 
B. Red Wars .............................................................................................................................................. 14 
C. King of Glory - Beta ............................................................................................................................. 18 
CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION ......................................................................................................................... 28 
CHAPTER 6. GENERAL SOLUTIONS AND PREVENTIONS ................................................................ 30 
General Solutions ...................................................................................................................................... 30 
Preventions ................................................................................................................................................ 31 
CHAPTER 7. UNPACKING ......................................................................................................................... 32 
Introduction to Packing ............................................................................................................................. 32 
Case Study: DrizzleDumper ...................................................................................................................... 35 
Case Study: Dex2oatHunter ...................................................................................................................... 37 
VirtualXposed + FDex2 ............................................................................................................................ 38 
CHAPTER 8. RECOVERY ........................................................................................................................... 42 
General Steps ............................................................................................................................................ 42 
Experiment ................................................................................................................................................ 43 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 45 
CHAPTER 9. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK .................................................................................... 46 






LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Android ransomware chronology ..................................................................................................... 8 
Figure 2. void d( ) function ............................................................................................................................ 12 
Figure 3. ijm-x86.so ....................................................................................................................................... 13 
Figure 4. void onCreate() ............................................................................................................................... 13 
Figure 5. Red Wars classes ............................................................................................................................ 15 
Figure 6. CharSequence and onDisableRequested() ...................................................................................... 15 
Figure 7. class raw ......................................................................................................................................... 16 
Figure 8. pin.txt .............................................................................................................................................. 16 
Figure 9. String getsss() ................................................................................................................................. 17 
Figure 10. Base64 Encoding .......................................................................................................................... 17 
Figure 11. Taking Sub-sequence .................................................................................................................... 17 
Figure 12. Personal Encryption Algorithm .................................................................................................... 18 
Figure 13. Base64 Encoding .......................................................................................................................... 18 
Figure 14. King of Glory - Beta, WannaCry Page ......................................................................................... 20 
Figure 15. Classes of King of Glory - Beta ................................................................................................... 21 
Figure 16. Control Flow Graph of decryptFile() ........................................................................................... 23 
Figure 17. Part of decryptFile() ..................................................................................................................... 24 
Figure 18. Part of jj() ..................................................................................................................................... 25 
Figure 19. Part of onCreate() ......................................................................................................................... 26 
Figure 20. Part of onClick() ........................................................................................................................... 27 
Figure 21. Packing Process ............................................................................................................................ 32 
Figure 22. Packed App ................................................................................................................................... 33 





LIST OF TABLES 






I would like to thank my committee chair, Guan Yong, and my committee 
members, Daji Qiao, and Jaeyoun Kim, for their guidance and support throughout the 
course of this research. 
In addition, I would also like to thank my friends, colleagues, the department 
faculty and staff for making my time at Iowa State University a wonderful experience. I 
want to also offer my appreciation to those who were willing to participate in my surveys 






With the rapid development of science and technology, the mobile device is 
becoming more and more powerful. However, technology is a two-edged sword, mobile 
devices also bring security risks. Malware or ransomware is not just for PC, but also a big 
threat to mobile device security. Because of these malicious applications, the user’s 
mobile device may be locked, files may be encrypted, and even personal information can 
be exposed in danger. Therefore, more researches and analysis on currently popular 
ransomware are necessary. This paper is going to conclude the taxonomy of Android 
ransomware in terms of the types of trend of Android ransomware, the locking/unlocking 
techniques, and the password-generate techniques of Android ransomware. We also 
performed both statistic and dynamic analysis on three typical Android applications that 
carry ransomware, using reverse engineering approach. Furthermore, since there are a 
great number of ransomware that we found are packed by third-party packer companies, 
this paper will include two separate chapters talking about a few approaches on 
unpacking and recovery, to support our security experiments. Lastly, in order to support 
some dynamic experiments in our team, this paper is going to contribute a general 





CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
Ransomware is one type of malware that intrudes the system using the malicious 
code, it can encrypt critical files, threaten users and request money for decryption, and give 
monetary damage to users (En.wikipedia.org, 2019) (Song, Kim and Lee, 2016). It was 
widely spread mainly on PC and website in the last decade. With the rapid growth of mobile 
device market such as smartphone, tablet, smart watch, the target of ransomware has been 
extended to the mobile device in the recent years. As Table. 1 shows, Android has taken 
85.0% of Smartphone OS Market Share in 2017 Q1 (IDC: The premier global market 
intelligence company, 2019). The reason that Android OS is such popular can include (1) 
Global partnerships and large installed base; (2) Powerful development framework; (3) Open 
market for distributing apps (Yang, 2015). Being a popular OS also expose itself in danger, 
according to a mobile threat report, there is an estimate 75 % increase in Android mobile 
malware encounter rates in the United States compared to 2013 (Lookout.com, 2019). 
According to ESET LiveGrid, the number of Android ransomware detections has grown in 
year on year comparisons by more than 50%, with the largest spike in the first half of 2016 
(Lipovsk, Tefanko and Brania, 2017). Nowadays, people rely on mobile devices such as 
smart phones and tablets much more than their personal computers and choose to store 
critical personal information such as bank account, credit card information and personal 
photos in the mobile device. Therefore, it is necessary to have more people working on the 






Table 1. Smart Device OS Market Share 
Period Android iOS Windows Phone Others 
2016Q1 83.4% 15.4% 0.8% 0.4% 
2016Q2 87.6% 11.7% 0.4% 0.3% 
2016Q3 86.8% 12.5% 0.3% 0.4% 
2016Q4 81.4% 18.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
2017Q1 85.0% 14.7% 0.1% 0.1% 
Since the first appearance of Android ransomware in 2012, it has been evolving into 
two major types and a lot of families in five years, one of the major types is screen locking, 
and the other one is file encryption. This paper is going to analyzing three cases of Android 
ransomware, the first two are lock-screen ransomware, which basically locks the device on a 
certain page, and ask the victims to pay the ransom for unlocking. The third case is an 
Android “WannaCry” ransomware, which encrypts all the media files using AES cipher, and 
also charges the victim money for decryption. All of these three ransomwares have been 
successfully cracked and tested on Android simulator. After the real-case analysis, we also 
concluded some general solution and suggestions to prevent some regular Android 
ransomware which reduces the risks of accidentally installing fake applications that carry 
ransomware and losing important data.  
In section II, we are going to introduce the taxonomy of ransomware application, 
including the trend of Android ransomware, the principle of device locking, and the different 
unlocking methods that are commonly used. In section III, we will describe three different 
ransomware cases, from both static and dynamic aspects, analyzing and showing the specific 




observed from the three cases. In section V, we will provide some possible general solutions 
about preventions that concluded from others’ work.  
In the next section, we are going to present some related research or analysis 




CHAPTER 2.    RELATED WORKS 
Android Defender 
Android Defender was one of the first ransomware family found on Android device 
in mid-2013, which is a classic  
fake antivirus (FakeAV) application which is found to be a ransomware. The FakeAV 
software is a type of scam using malware that intentionally misrepresents the security status 
of a computer and attempts to convince the user to purchase a full version of the software in 
order to remediate non- existing infections (Symantec Security Response, 2019). This 
application performs a fake virus scan and keeps informing the user that there are threats on 
the device, by showing the real name of files in the SD card to make it more believable. The 
warning from this ransomware application is endless until the user chooses to pay $40 to 
$100 for an activation code to remove “threats”. This ransomware is kind of “soft” locking 
the victim’s devices by continuously popping out the warning, which practically makes the 
device unusable. According to a full analysis that was performed by Naked Security 
(Ducklin, 2019), this ransomware is just simply picking some random virus names to display 
on the device by using Math.random() function, even if the device is certainly uninfected 
with any virus at all. The activate code is hard-coded and can be easily traced using any 
Android decompiler. After activating, we can clean it up by simply removing it.  
Simplocker 
The Simplocker is the first file-encrypting found on Android in May 2014. This 
ransomware was firstly launched in Rus- sia. After installation, a message written in Russian 
will be displayed on the screen, a separate thread in the background will start to encrypt files 




on, as a ransomware, it charges 260 UAH from decryption (Securehoney.net, 2019). Since it 
is a early development version of crypto ransomware, it is very easy to crack. According to 
the analysis provided by Secure Honey (Securehoney.net, 2019), since the the cipher key is 
hard-coded in plaintext, and the decryption function can be found in the same class as the 
encryption function if using a good decompiler. It is totally possible to write a separate 
decryption program under any IDE.  
WannaCry 
In May 2017, a PC ransomware WannaCry was spread widely and quickly on 
Windows machine all over the world. It makes use of the vulnerabilities in the Windows 
Server Message Block (SMB) to rapidly spread by worm (Bobao.360.cn, 2019). This 
ransomware encrypts the system files and then demands various Bitcoins payments 
equivalent from $300 to $600 for decryption. According to a report provided by 360 Se- 
curity Team(Blogs.360.cn, 2019), this WannaCry ransomware encrypts the file system 
recursively using a combination of the RSA and AES encryption algorithms, where the RSA 
encryption comes directly from the Windows Crypto API, but the AES encryption is 
implemented by a third-party and is statically linked within this ransomware, which makes it 
impossible to crack the encryption process without knowing the private key. After 
encryption, this ransomware fills random bytes to the targeted files with certain extensions, 
which are considered as super important files, it then moves these files to a temporary 
working directory and deletes them. After this process, the names of metafiles would be 
changed, which increase the difficulty to recover for some regular data recovery software. 
Due to these restrictions, current solutions cannot ensure to recover all the files, but only 




In the next section, we are going to introduce the categories of Android ransomware, 
including technical principles of locking an Android device, and the unlocking techniques 





CHAPTER 3.    TAXONOMY 
Types of Android Ransomware 
There are two general categories of ransomware on Android: 1) Lock-screen 
ransomware, 2) Crypto-ransomware. 
In lock-screen types of ransomware, the hijacked resource is access to the 
compromised system. In file-encrypting “crypto- ransomware” that hijacked resource is the 
user’s files (Lipovsk, Tefanko and Brania, 2017). Both types of the ransomware have been 
found on the Windows platform previously, and all of them have been causing trouble to 
both individuals and business.  
Trend of Android Ransomware 
The Android ransomware trend is shown in the Figure 1. We can see the first 
ransomware on Android was found since 2012, there was a fake antivirus application called 
Fake AVs, which performs a fake scan on the device, and then charge money for removing 
threats. In 2014, the new generation Android police ransomware came out, which is also 
known as lock-screen ransomware, and it is the primary type of ransomware on the market so 
far. In the same year, the first file-encrypting crypto-ransomware appeared as Android 
Simplocker. Android ransomware is continuously evolving and forming new families years 





Figure 1. Android ransomware chronology 
 
Most of currently existing Android ransomware applications are lock-screen 
ransomware because this type of ransomware is relatively easy to implement, possible to 
reproduce, and pretty effective. What it can do is to lock the screen, make the device totally 
unusable, then charge money for unlocking service. On the other hand, crypto-ransomware is 
not so popular until the middle of 2017, right after the burst of WannaCry ransomware on 
PC, some ransomwares are found to use the similar strategy to encrypt user’s files, and 
charge money for decryption, just like a mobile WannaCry. We cannot conclude the 
techniques of crypto-ransomware because there are so different and there are limited 
samples, but we are going to analyze one crypto-ransomware case in the Case Studies 
section. In the next a few paragraphs, we are going to go over different technology principles 
of lock-screen types of ransomware that conclude by (Blogs.360.cn, 2019).  
Techniques of Lock-screen Ransomware 
Attackers can make use of WindowManager.LayoutParams flags attribute. By 




WindowMan- ager.LayoutParams, such as “FLAG FULLSCREEN”, and “FLAG LAYOUT 
IN SCREEN”, together with a permission “SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW”, can bring and 
lock the float- ing window to top in full screen, which locks the screen and makes the device 
not work properly.  
Lock-screen can also be realized by monitoring the top activity by TimerTask, if it is 
detected is not the lock- screen activity itself, I will restart and set the addFlag to FLAG 
ACTIVITY NEW TASK, which can overwrite and kill the process of the original activity, 
then the lock-screen activity is locked at the top, and thus hijacked the device. Fortunately, 
Android 5.0 or above versions have taken a protective mechanism to prevent this attack.  
Another way to lock a screen is to simply shield the home/return button, volume 
button, and other virtual buttons by rewriting the onKeyDown method, which results in the 
effect of no response upon pressing button, to lock the screen.  
If a device has not been set an unlocking password yet, by inducing the user to 
activate the Device Manager/root permisson during installation, it can force the device to set 
an unlock password without noticing the user, causing the user not able to unlock the device. 
if the device has been previously set a password, with the root permission, it can also modify 
the /data/system/password.key file to remove or change the password.  
Unlocking Techniques 
After locking the device, the attackers will charge money for unlocking, there are a 
few ways that are commonly used for unlocking.  
1. The most straight forward way is to enter the unlock password to unlock, which 
means the user redeems the unlock code or password by paying money, and then 
enter the code directly in the lock-screen page to unlock the device. This is one of 




2. There are a few cases that use SMS or network to unlock. SMS control unlock, 
that is, by receiving the specific SMS number or SMS content to unlock the 
device remotely. This unlock method may reveal the attacker’s phone number.  
3. For the network unlocking, attackers use anonymous communication technologies 
such as Tor browser to remotely control unlocking service in order to hide their 
personal information. This anonymous technique was originally designed to 
protect the privacy, but now it is abused by a lot of malware. 
4. Some attackers even made the unlocking applications for specific ransomware, to 
reduce the complexity of unlocking process.  
In the next section, we will present case studies of three different Android 
ransomware applications. For each of them, we will describe how it affects your device, the 
process of cracking it, and an effective solution.  
Password Generate Techniques 
Among these unlock method, the most common way is to enter a password, so here I 
conclude some password generate methods 
1. The password can be just hardcoded in plaintext in the code, which will be very easy 
to find. 
2. The password can be generated with a specific random serial number, which most 
likely the attackers will let victims know the serial number and ask to pay the ransom 
along with the serial number, so that they will send you back the password that 
corresponds to the serial number. 
3. The serial number and password can be both generated randomly, with no relations, 
but stored as a key-value pair, and this pair may be encrypted and sent to the attackers 




CHAPTER 4.    CASE ANALYSIS 
This section is going to perform statistic and dynamic analysis on three currently 
existing Android ransomware applications using reverse engineering approach. For statistical 
analysis, we will be using a decompiler tool called Jeb (Pnfsoftware.com, 2019), which is a 
powerful tool that can converts bytecode to java and extracts all the classes, manifest, 
certificate and all the assets files. We also use one graphic tool from Soot (GitHub, 2019), 
which is one basic package of a taint-analysis tool Flowdroid (Secure Software Engineering, 
2019). Soot is a Java optimization framework, which provides intermediate representations 
for analyzing and transforming Java bytecode. to generate control flow graphs for some 
functions. For dynamic analysis, we use the Bluestack (Bluestacks - The Best Android 
Emulator on PC as Rated by You, 2019) to simulate Android environment. All the 
ransomware samples are downloaded from Janus, which is a mobile security platform that 
allows users to upload suspicious application and perform security scan to determine if the 
application is safe or not. It also keeps updating their database and encourage security experts 
and reverse engineer to contribute.  
A. SB Modifier 
1) Ransomware Description: SB Modifier is an Android game modifier that was 
supposed to be a third-party application that allows users to modify the game data. However, 
this sample APK was injected malicious resources and repackaged. Fortunately, the 
encryption method is relatively easy, so it is a good place to start.  
When installing SB Modifier, it will ask the user the administration permission, and 
once you allow this permission, your device will restart and gets locked by then. On the lock 




unique for a device, and will not change upon restarting the device), an input box which is 
extremely hard to find, an OR code for payment, and some contact information. Like other 
lock-screen application, all the buttons except the power button has been tampered, so you 
can go nowhere.  
2) Analysis: Our goal here is to find the password using reverse engineering approach 
with the de-compiler tool Jeb. After importing this APK to Jeb, we found there are only a 
few ordinary classes such as BuildConfig.java, R.java, a.java, b.java, and c.java, and there is 
no malicious or suspicious code founded in this classes after simply scanning through each 
class. We then took a close look at these classes and found in class c.java, there is a 
suspicious line of code in the private void d( ) function shows in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. void d( ) function 
The author was trying to open a library file “ijm-x86.so” which is located in the Asset 
directory. It seems to be normal to utilize functions from the library, however, this could be a 
good place to store the malicious code. Therefore, we located this library file and decompile 
it again using Jeb, there we found a group of very typical locking-screen virus classes shows 





Figure 3. ijm-x86.so 
In the s.java class, we found a void function onCreate( ) (Figure 4), which generates 
the password.  
 
Figure 4. void onCreate() 
3) Result: The password generation procedure is relatively easy, the “pass” is found 
to be the unique serial number that randomly generated when this application is installed (It 
is 79 in our case), the “passw” is the password we are looking for, and it just does a lot of bit 
math on the serial number, so we can calculate the unlocking password very easily by 
plugging in the serial number.  
This ransomware sample is a very typical one, the encryp- tion algorithm pretty easy, 





B. Red Wars 
1) Ransomware Description: Red Wars is an application that was designed as a plug-
in to some social chatting application such as WeChat, to help user grab Red Pocket (aka 
money) as fast as it can. As an external plug-in, these applications like Red Wars are required 
to take the root permission because they need to take control of your device to perform some 
scripts. Although in the recent Android version, the system will warn you the consequences 
you will get if you give the root permission, but people download and install this application 
with their own intentions, so it is highly possible that even a user with a little knowledge 
could get fooled.  
During the process of installation, it asks you a bunch of permission such as root 
permission, internet permission, and boot receiver permission, if we accept it, then the device 
will restart and enter a lock screen. There are only an input box and a button on the screen 
with an anime picture as a background. it looks like a semi-finished product because there is 
no payment method or contact information on the screen, but it does not affect our unlocking 
process since we are not going to pay them anyway.  
2) Analysis: After importing this application to Jeb, besides the package of malicious 
classes, we found a separate package that contains a class named “ADRT” (Shows in Figure 
5), this is an evidence that this application was developed with AIDE (Android Integrated 
Development Environment), which is an IDE that user can development Android application 
on an Android device, this environment allows unprofessional people can modify or create 
android applications, inject malicious code to a popular and widely used application, or 
simply modify an existing ransomware by changing the key value and contact/payment 




semi-finished product and some code with weird logic which I will introduce in the next a 
few paragraphs.  
 
Figure 5. Red Wars classes 
In the MyAdmin.java class, we found a CharSequence (Figure 6) function that 
contains code to change the password:  
 
Figure 6. CharSequence and onDisableRequested() 
First of all, it locks your device when the user requests to disable this application, and 
it resets the password with String v7. Lastly, it calls super and lets system to process this 
request. There is another function called onPasswordChanged( ), which was implemented 
very similar as onDisableRequest( ), both of them are made to prevent user from unlocking.  
What we are interested in is the String v7. The key of that is the function getsss( ) in 




Let’s analyze it from inner to outer. To figure out the Raw Recourse, we need to 
check the class R.java. In there, we found an inner class (Figure 7) 
 
Figure 7. class raw 
We can see that the raw data 2131099650 we found matches the integer pin. Thanks 
to Jeb, we can also explore the resources such as drawable, layout and raw files along with 
the Apk. In the raw directory, there are 3 text files as the Figure 8. shows. What we are 
interested in is the pin.txt, and indeed it stores pin code: Cj09UWU1bFhl.  
 
Figure 8. pin.txt 
The getString( ) function in BAH.java class is nothing but changing the argument one 
character by one character to string, so our next goal is to figure out what getsss( ) does.  
In the M.java class, we found the String type getsss( ) function shows in Figure 9. 
There are a few Chinese characters with no special meanings, they are used as input for 





Figure 9. String getsss() 
To make it clear and readable, I rewrite the code in Eclipse. In the following 
paragraph, I will explain every line with my rewriting and the output I got from Eclipse.  
The first line (Figure 10) is taking a string’s byte value as input, and encoding using 
Base64 standard.  
 
Figure 10. Base64 Encoding 
The output of s1: “Ynk65b285bK46IqxIHFx0jEyNzk1MjU3Mzg”  
After that, it takes the sub-sequence from index 3 to 4, and from index 4 to 5 (Figure 
11), where the begin index is inclusive and the end index is exclusive. Therefore, it turns out 
that it only takes the single character of index 3 and 4 of the string s1.  
 
Figure 11. Taking Sub-sequence 
The output:  s2 = “6”, s3 = “5”.  
The last line is a very long and complex but ridicules string builder. I will separate it 




The first part (Figure 12) is the inner string buffer, there are two Chinese terms, and I 
replace the first term with “aaa”, and the second term with “bbb”. This replacement will not 
affect the output of the code as you will see what it actually does.  
 
Figure 12. Personal Encryption Algorithm 
This part replaces all the “6” (s2) in the pin with “aaa”, then replace all the “5” (s3) in 
the pin with “bbb”, then replace all the “aaa” with “6”, and finally replaces all the “bbb” with 
“5”. What it does is just swap all the “5” and “6”, and the hilarious point is that there are no 
“5” or “6” in the pin at all. Thus, the output s4 is still the pin, which is “Cj09UWU1bFhl”.  
Next, it applies the Base64 decoder of s4 (Figure 13), which makes s5 = 
“==Qe5lXe”, then it takes reverse of s5, so s6 = “eXl5eQ==”, and finally, it decodes s6 
again, so the final string s7 = “yyyy”, which is the password to unlock the screen. 
 
Figure 13. Base64 Encoding 
3) Result: So far, we have successfully cracked this lock screening ransomware. We 
can see this kind of ransomware is easy to reproduce, just by simply changing the pin 
number, and the non-sense in swapping s2 and s3 indicates this code has been modified and 
reproduced. This is a very dangerous trend since people with not enough knowledge about 
software engineering can develop their own ransomware easily, and people who are expert 
can sell their reproducible ransomware.  
C. King of Glory - Beta  
1) Ransomware Description: King of Glory is a very famous mobile game in China 




this game, there is even e-sports competition holding in a lot of cities. Being such a hot 
online mobile game, many third- party add-ons and plug-ins applications have been 
developed in Android market, which requests administrator permission to take control of the 
device, meanwhile, it leaves the device in danger.  
In June of 2017, right after the exposure of WannaCry ransomware in PC, there are a 
few King of Glory related Android applications named “King of Glory - Assist” or “King of 
Glory - Beta” spreading in Chinese Android market, which carries the mobile version of 
WannaCry ransomware. In the following a few paragraphs, I will present the case study of 
“King of Glory - Beta”.  
Before installation, I stored some photos and Microsoft Word documents in the media 
storage. During the installation, it will ask administrator permission as expected. For the first 
time opening this application, it will enter a loading screen, and says “First time using, 
exporting configuration files...” in Chinese. This process takes quite an amount of time, 
depending on the usage of your storage, because it is actually traversing your directories and 
performing encryption on your files. When this “configuration” process finishes, it will enter 





Figure 14. King of Glory - Beta, WannaCry Page 
The Chinese description is just a translation of the original English version 
WannaCry, which basically says that some important files of the device such as photos, 
pictures, documents, compressed files, music, video files and text files have been encrypted 
so that you cannot open it anymore. it tries to convince the victims that the only way to 
recover the files is to contact them and pay for the decryption. It has a three-day countdown 
to raise the payment, and a seven-day countdown to start deleting the files. There is a pin 
code in the bottom left, which is 10602889 in this case, and they asked victims to send them 
the pin code along with the payment so that they will provide the decryption key. The 
payment can be processed in Alipay, WeChat pay, and QQ pay, which are three major 
mobile payment applications in China. The developer left their OR codes for those three 
payments, and charges for 20 Chinese dollars for decryption within three days.  
Unlike the other lock-screen ransomware, this WannaCry page will not lock the 
screen. We can still go back to home screen and run other applications and settings, however, 
this application will send out a warning message: “Do not close or uninstall this application, 




checked the Media Manager, where I stored pictures and documents in, and found all the 
files are simply invisible in Bluestacks simulator, I believe this is because the encrypted files 
format is unable to view in this Media Manager. Anyway, all the media files are “gone” by 
now, so we need to proceed to analyze this WannaCry ransomware.  
2) Analysis: First of all, I imported this ransomware APK to decompile every class. 
There are only 7 classes (Figure 15) in total, and the naming of the classes is very similar to 
the other samples I analyzed in previous sections.  
 
Figure 15. Classes of King of Glory - Beta 
Usually, we should check the MainActivity.java class first, but by experience, I went 
for the sss.java class, because assuming it comes from the same author, then he or she usually 
store the malicious code in this class. As we expected, in the sss.java class, we found 
functions such as void delete Dir(), void deleteDirWithFile(), File encryptFile(), and File 
decryptFile(). From these delete functions, we found that it not only deletes files from DCIM 
(Data Center Infrastructure Management), it also accesses some Cloud drive, for example 




perform encryption using AES Cipher. In order to solve this ransomware problem, what we 
are interested most the decryption function.  
The decryption function is very long, and there are a lot of “goto” calls with “labels”. 
It might be the author’s intention to use “goto”, because most Java IDE cannot compile it, 
and so fewer people can crack his or her decryption method. Or it might be the decompiler 
issue, when it gets converted from byte code, which has a lot of “goto” and “jump”, it will 
not re-organize to a nice loop with if statements. We can certainly rewrite the encryption 
code and run some tests in Eclipse, but the relations between each “goto” and “labels” are 
very complex, it will take a long time to re-organize it by hand, and even if we rewrite it, we 
cannot ensure the correctness and credibility.  
Therefore, in order to see the relations between these “goto” and “labels”, we 
installed an open-source decompile tool called “Soot”. One tool of Soot is the CFG Viewer, 
which allows taking input as Android Apk, and then it will return the control flow graph of 
every function in that Apk. The complete control flow graph of File decryptFile() function is 









Now we have the control flow graph of the decryption function, but we still do not 
understand the meaning of these randomly named variables and arguments, and how the 
parameters are passed. Thus, I started to analyze the parameter of the decryption function 
first. As Figure 17 shows, the decryption function takes three String type arguments as 
parameters, to find out what are they represent, we need to find where the decryption 
function is called.  
 
Figure 17. Part of decryptFile() 
In the same class, we found a function void jj() calls decryption function. It also has 
three arguments, they are File arg12, String arg13, and Int arg14 respectively, as shows in 
Figure 18. From this function, we can see that the jj() function is passing its parameters to 
decryptFile(), it converts the File arg12 to String type, and call getsss() on the String arg13. 
The getsss() function is just a personal encryption that performs some string modification on 
the arguments. The third argument of decryptFile() is a substring of the file name which from 





Figure 18. Part of jj() 
So far, we knew that the parameters of the decryption function are a String message, a 
String filename, and a substring of the filename. Thus, we move to MainActivity.java class to 
see how is variable hzs is defined.  
In the MainActivity.java class, we found the onCreate() contains the declaration and 
initiation of hzs shows in Figure 19. The hzs is the length of variable hz, and hz is a string 
that was built very complexly. It is not completely shown in Figure 19 for the string building 
of hz, so I will describe specifically here. Firstly, it calls a l() function, which is also a 
personal string modifier function, it takes Thai characters and converts it to a Chinese 
sentence, which basically says “Do not uninstall this application, contact xxxx for 





Figure 19. Part of onCreate() 
Still in the onCreate() function, xh is defined in an if-else statement. The first 
statement checks if xh is already defined in shared preferences, if not, initiate xh as a random 
number * 1000000 + 10000000 and convert it to string. So far, we can conclude that hzs is 
depending on an random number xh, which does not make sense to perform decryption.  
Although we got stuck on tracking a parameter of the decryption function, we found 
quite a few interesting variables defined in the MainActivity.java class, especially the 
randomly defined variable xh. When I was running some tests in Eclipse of the process of 
initializing xh, I found the random output is very similar to the pin code that we got on the 
WannaCry page. If xh is the pin, then the if-else statement on generating xh makes much 
more sense, because if the application is first- time open, then it will go to “else” and 




Assuming xh is the pin code, then we need to find where uses xh besides the hz. 
Luckily, just around the initialization of hz and hzs, there is a string variable m defined as xh 
* 4 + 3 and converted to string.  
Now we know m, again we need to find where uses m. In the MainActivity.java class, 
a void run() calls deleteDr(), and one of the parameters of deleteDr() is m. However, this 
does not help out, because we do not care how it deletes files. After a global searching of 
variable m, we found that in class qq1279525738.java, there is a function void onClick() 
checks if the toast text input is equal to m, shows in Figure 20. Although it does not call the 
decryption function directly after key match, instead of it, it starts a new thread which 
performs the decryption. Also, by reading the messages that it prints after key match, we 
know that the decryption process begins.  
 
Figure 20. Part of onClick() 
3) Result: Therefore, the key to decrypt is the pin code * 4 + 3. I have tried with the 
Bluestacks simulator and it worked, all my media files went back after the decryption. Also, 
there is a website (Tencent Games, 2019) that Tencent Inc. provides that let users who 
accidentally installed King of Glory ransomware to input the pin code, and they will output 




CHAPTER 5.    DISCUSSION 
Generally speaking, all of the three ransomware cases are disabling users’ devices by 
either locking the screen, or encrypting media files, and charging money for the password to 
unlock or decrypt. The malicious code may be injected into a popular application, or a 
complete fake application only shares the same name and icon with some certain well- 
known application to induce users to download and install. An interesting thing is that the 
applications that ransomware tries to foreign are different among countries. In the United 
States, most ransomware applications are disguised as porn videos, Adobe Flash Player and 
some system software updates. Whereas in China, ransomware application can be seen as the 
game plug-in, free Wi-Fi, and “like” gathering tools.  
The method to unlock for the three cases are all entering a password that “purchased” 
from attackers, this is the most straightforward way and the safest way. Moreover, with this 
unlocking method, a ransomware developer can sell the pro- gram to attackers who have less 
knowledge about Android development, but they can easily modify the ransomware by 
changing the pin value, or some input variables that an algorithm used to generate the 
password, to make a ransomware reproducible and unique to one attacker. What is worse, the 
ransomware developer usually places an advertisement of their ransomware products and 
leave their contact information. Since the attackers are spreading the ransomware application 
over the internet, which actually advertises their ransomware products for free. Thus, not 
only the original attackers buy ransomware from the developer, even some victims became 
the attackers after being blackmailed. Therefore, a ransomware development, selling, 




The ransomware industrial chain can be formed because there is a market, not every 
Android user is an expert in using Android device and has the knowledge of how the 
ransomware works, so there are still quite amount of people paying for unlocking their 
device. However, paying is not stopping the attack, but encouraging this ransomware 
industry. Thus, we should never pay for unlocking, and there are actually other ways to save 
your device if you are accidentally installed an application with ransomware. In the next 
section, I am going to conclude some possible general solutions as well as some preventions 




CHAPTER 6.    GENERAL SOLUTIONS AND PREVENTIONS 
Since it is impossible to analyze every Android ransomware application to find the 
key for unlocking or decryption, it is necessary to have some general solutions that can 
possibly save the device which has already locked. Some general solutions that I concluded 
as follows.  
General Solutions 
The first method and is worth to try is to restart the device and delete the ransomware 
application quickly. However, this method depends on the operating environment of the 
device, and the implementation of the ransomware, so it only works for a few ransomwares.  
Fortunately, Some first aid kits for the mobile device are very powerful right now, 
although it takes some memory to run and may be placed with some advertisement, it is still 
worth to install because most of them can detect and stop from installing an application with 
malware, kill the locking process, and uninstall it automatically.  
Entering security mode is also an effective way to remove the ransomware 
application. What you need to do is to forcibly shut down the device by holding the power 
button, and then restart the device. Then enter the security mode (different brands and 
devices may have different ways to enter the security mode, you may need to check the user 
manual of the device). Find the ransomware application in the setting page, uninstall it and 
then restart.  
For users with some technical background, if the device is rooted and the USB 
debugging mode is turned on, you can connect the device to a computer and run ADB 
command. If the ransomware is setting or tampering the unlocking password, then use rm 




ransomware, you can also use rm command to delete the ransomware application installation 
path.  
Preventions 
There are also a lot of ways to prevent some regular ransomware from being installed. 
There are a few details you should pay attention to when downloading and install an 
unknown application:  
First of all, the size of an Android application is an indicator to determine if it 
contains ransomware, a typical plain ransomware Apk will not be too large, usually less than 
5Mb if it is not injected into a regular application. So, if the size of Apk that you download is 
way less than what it is expected, be careful about this Apk. Secondly, the name of an 
Android application is also a good clue. Most ransomware applications are disguised as the 
game plug-in, free WiFi, and “like” gathering tools. Do not simply trust this kind of 
applications. Last but not least, the permissions request that pops out during application 
installation is very important. Most ran- somware applications will ask for some sensitive 
permissions such as “SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW”, “WAKE LOCK”, “RECEIVE BOOT 
COMPLETED” and so on. These are the evidence that the package you are about to install 
may have the malicious program within, and in fact, what most security applications do is 
trying to analyze permissions and system intent to identify malicious applications (Schmeelk, 
2014). Thus, we need to think carefully if the application we are about to install requires 
these permissions, if not, do not trust them easily, use some security applications to scan it 
before installing it if you really want that application.  
Other suggestions can be: Downloading the package from large and trusted sites, 





CHAPTER 7.    UNPACKING 
As the experiments on Android ransomware move further, we found many 
ransomware apps are “guarded” or “packed” by some third-party packing services. This issue 
increases the difficulty of analyzing ransomware apps significantly, as we have to find a way 
to unpack it in order to decompile it and extract the original code. Therefore, it is necessary 
to have research on packing, unpacking, as well as the recovery process in order to dive deep 
in Android ransomware. In the following sections, we are going to give a brief introduction 
of the packing process, a few explanations of principles of three typical unpacking tools, and 
also the recovery process. 
Introduction to Packing 
Code packing was originally designed to protect intellectual property, which is also a 
double-edged sword to the security community, as the packers are widely used by Android 
malware or ransomware to hide their malicious code. There are a lot of companies that are 
providing cloud packing services nowadays, such as Bangcle, Baidu, Alibaba, Qihoo360, etc. 
The techniques of packing among these companies are not quite identical, but the main 





















The three objects that we need in the packing process are 1. The original Apk which 
needs to be packed; 2. The shell Apk, which used for decryption; 3. An encryption tool. The 
basic process is, first we encrypt the original Apk with the encryption tool, and then merge 
with the shell Apk to obtain a new dex file. Finally, we can replace the dex file of the shell 
Apk with the new dex file, which makes the shell Apk be a new Apk. The new shell Apk is 
called a “packed” Apk, which is responsible for decrypting the original Apk, then 
dynamically load the Apk and run as normal. The output of this packing process can be 








As our goal is to unpack Apk, and almost every packing process will have its 
corresponding unpack Apk within, it will make the unpacking process much easier if we can 
understand how does the shell Apk work from each company. 
 The general idea of shell Apk is to use java reflection to replace the ‘mClassLoader’ 
in ‘android.app.ActivityThread’ to the ‘DexClassLoader’ of the original Apk, in this way, it 
can guarantee that it will load the original program under the shell Apk environment and 


















Figure 23. Shell Apk Process 
 
The overall procedures of the shell Apk process can be concluded as follows: 
1. Obtain the dex file of the shell Apk 
2. Find the original Apk from the dex file, and run the decryption process (the 
decryption process must be corresponding to the encryption of the packing 
process, otherwise it will raise dex loading error) 
3. Obtain the dex file from the decrypted original Apk 
4. Load the Application of the original Apk according to the metadata of 
‘AndroidManifest.xml’ 
 
Inspiring by the process of the shell Apk, we can think of two approaches to unpack 
an Apk based on the given unpack Apk: 1) Figure out the encryption & decryption method 
that each company uses, so we can decrypt the original Apk statistically. 2) Dump the dex 
file of the original Apk from memory in runtime. There are pros and cons between these two 
approaches, approach one does not require to run the Apk on device or simulator, which 














prevents devices from being in danger since we are dealing with malicious apps, however, to 
understand or rewrite the decryption method is a difficult and time-consuming work, and it is 
not a universal way to unpack. On the other hand, approach two is a more general way and 
most of the recent unpacking tools use this approach, there will be no worries on the 
decryption as it is unpacking dynamically, so the difficulty of this approach is on system 
level. First of all, the packed app must be runnable under our system environment, and in 
order to dump data from system, we might need to grant root permission on device, for some 
tool that I am about to discuss, we may even need to modify the system code and build a new 
environment just for unpacking. In the following sections, we will go through three unpack 
tools, regarding their principle, pros and cons, and also involving experiments that we have 
done. 
Case Study: DrizzleDumper 
DrizzleDumper is an unpacking tool based on searching dex files by memory 
features, developed by (DrizzleRisk, 2017). The pre-requite of this unpacking tool is under 
root environment, and the idea is to use ‘ptrace’ to attach the process of the target apk, then 
performs a feature search among the memory of the target process, once it finds a matching, 
it will dump the dex files from memory. 
The essential part of code is as follows, it firstly attaches pid using ptrace, then 
perform feature search to find the “magic” memory in that target pid process, and lastly 
dump dex files after it found matchings. 
1. // Attach process id using ptrace, then perform feature search in the target pid 
process, and finally dump dex files if found matchings 
2.       if(find_magic_memory(clone_pid, mem_file, &memory, dumped_file_name) <= 0)   
  
3.       {     
4.         printf("[*]  The magic was Not Found!\n");     




6.         close(mem_file);     
7.         continue;     
8.       }     
9.       else     
10.       {     
11.          // dex dump successfully, break the loop     
12.          close(mem_file);     
13.          ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, clone_pid, NULL, 0);     
14.          break;     
15.       }  
Experiment 
Environment: 
A rooted device or simulator 
Installed Android Debug Bridge (adb) 
Installed target packed app, make sure it is runnable on device 
Steps: 
1. Download drizzleDumper from github 
2. adb push drizzleDumper to /data/local/tmp of the device or simulator 
3. ./drizzleDumper [target_package_name] [wait_time] 
4. Open the target app 
5. adb pull the dex files under /data/local/tmp 
Notes: wait_time is in second, and we can choose different wait_time (normally 1-3 
sec) if the dex was not dumped successfully. This is because the appearance time and 
lasting time for a dex file are different for different packers. 
Results: Apks packed from Qihoo360 can be successfully dumped by this unpacking 
tool, packers from other company cannot be dumped or dumped an empty dex file. 
Pros & cons 
The DrizzleDumper is relatively easy to use and to understand the principle, it does 




DrizzleDumper only works for Qihoo360, which is definitely not a universal unpacking tool 
that we are looking for. 
Case Study: Dex2oatHunter 
Dex2oatHunter (Spriteviki, 2016) is another unpacking tool that is based on the 
source code of Android runtime (ART). It is a modification of Android 4.4 source code 
mainly in “art/dex2oat/dex2oat.cc” 
In ART environment, most codes are compiled ahead-of-time, it transforms byte code 
to native code, which improves the performance of the Android app. The workflow of 
compilation is apk à dex à oat, and the idea of Dex2oatHunter is to dump the dex files 
from memory in the timing just before the dex2oat process happens, to achieve the 
unpacking purpose. As an example of Android 4.4 source code showing below, in 
“/art/dex2oat/dex2oat.cc” (line 14).  It checks if the dex file has written permission before 
calling the dex2oat function, and Dex2oatHunter chooses this timing to dump dex files use a 
given file descriptor. 
1. for(constauto& dex_file : dex_files) {   
2.     if(!dex_file->EnableWrite()) {   
3.         PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to make .dex file writeable '"<< dex_file->GetLocati
on() << "'\n";   
4.     }   
5.     std::stringdex_name = dex_file->GetLocation();   
6.     LOG(INFO) << "Finding:dex file name-->"<< dex_name;   
7.     // dump dex files for packer: qihoo360 
8.     if(dex_name.find("jiagu") != std::string::npos) {   
9.         LOG(INFO) << "Finding:dex file from qihoo-->"<< dex_name;   
10.         int len = dex_file->Size();   
11.         charfilename[256] = {0};   
12.         sprintf(filename, "%s_%d.dex", dex_name.c_str(), len);   
13.         int fd = open(filename , O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC , S_IRWXU);   
14.         if(fd > 0) {   
15.             if(write(fd, (char*)dex_file->Begin(), len) <= 0) {   
16.                 LOG(INFO) << "Finding:write target dex file failed-
->"<< filename;   
17.             }   
18.             LOG(INFO) << "Finding:write target dex file successfully-
->"<< filename;   
19.             close(fd);   




21.             LOG(INFO) << "Finding:open target dex file failed-->"<< filename;   
22.         }   
23.     }   
24. }   
 
Experiment 
This tool was abandoned due to it is very time consuming in building source code 
(will be talked about in pros & cons), while we wanted to make some modification of the 
original code and test it on a real device. 
Pros & cons 
 Dex2oatHunter supports ART, which is the newer version of Android runtime, 
according to the author’s test, it can successfully unpack Qihoo360 and Legu packers due to 
the special “timing” of dumping dex files, and ideally may work for more company as it can 
define the packer’s package name(line 8). However, the biggest shortage is the time it takes 
to build source code, and any changes we made to test, require 5-6 hours to build with 
chances of failures. Another fact is it only support ART, but we are looking for a universal 
unpacker that should be able to take care of both DVM and ART environment. 
 VirtualXposed + FDex2 
FDex2 is a relatively new unpacking tool based on VirtualXposed framework, which 
is developed by a forum user in 2018. We cannot find an authorized Github, but it is a brand-
new approach of unpacking compares to others, so it is meaningful to talk about its principle, 
in respect of VirtualXposed and FDex2 separately. 
VirtualXposed: 
Xposed is a framework for modules that can change the behavior of Android system 
and apps without touching any APKs. However, there are a lot of limitations such as it is 




using this framework. The VirtualXposed, on the other hand, it is not necessary to have root 
permission in order to utilize Xposed. The working principle of VirtualXposed is as the name 
of it, to create a “virtual” environment in the device, and launch Xposed in this virtual 
environment, and all the apps or modules that we need will be installed in this virtual 
environment to make use of Xposed framework. Since it is a virtual environment, any 
modules (e.g. FDex2) or apps (apps to be unpacked) that be installed into VirtualExposed 
will not affect the Android system. 
FDex2: 
FDex2 is a small module that can be run in Xposed or VirtualXposed framework. The 
idea of this module is, by hooking the loadClass method in ClassLoader, using reflection to 
call getDex method to obtain Dex object(com.android.dex.Dex), and then write the dex object 
to files. The core code is just a class hook method and is included as follows: 
1. public void handleLoadPackage(XC_LoadPackage.LoadPackageParam lpparam) throws Throw
able {   
2.         xsp = new XSharedPreferences("com.ppma.appinfo", "User");   
3.         xsp.makeWorldReadable();   
4.         xsp.reload();   
5.         initRefect();   
6.         packagename = xsp.getString("packagename", null);   
7.         XposedBridge.log("  "+packagename);   
8.         if ((!lpparam.packageName.equals(packagename))||packagename==null) {   
9.             XposedBridge.log(" , , ");   
10.             return;   
11.         }   
12.         XposedBridge.log("  "+lpparam.packageName);   
13.         String str = "java.lang.ClassLoader";   
14.         String str2 = "loadClass";   
15.    
16.         XposedHelpers.findAndHookMethod(str, lpparam.classLoader, str2, String.clas
s, Boolean.TYPE, new XC_MethodHook() {   
17.             protected void afterHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwabl
e {   
18.                 super.afterHookedMethod(param);   
19.                 Class cls = (Class) param.getResult();   
20.                 if (cls == null) {   
21.                     XposedBridge.log("cls == null");   
22.                     return;   
23.                 }   




25.                 XposedBridge.log("  " + name);   
26.                 byte[] bArr = (byte[]) Dex_getBytes.invoke(getDex.invoke(cls, new O
bject[0]), new Object[0]);   
27.                 if (bArr == null) {   
28.                     XposedBridge.log(" ");   
29.                     return;   
30.                 }   
31.                 XposedBridge.log(" ");   
32.                 String dex_path = "/data/data/" + packagename + "/" + packagename +
 "_" + bArr.length + ".dex";   
33.                 XposedBridge.log(dex_path);   
34.                 File file = new File(dex_path);   
35.                 if (file.exists()) return;   
36.                 writeByte(bArr, file.getAbsolutePath());   
37.             }   
38.             } );   




An Android device or simulator with system version 4.4 or above 
VirtualXposed 
Steps: 
1. Install VirtualExposed, FDex2, and the app to be unpacked on the Android device 
2. Open VirtualExposed, install FDex2 module within the VirtualExposed 
environment and activate FDex2 
3. Install the target app within VirtualExposed 
4. Run FDex2 in VirtualExposed, setup the target app to hook its package name 
5. Run the target app in VirtualExposed 
6. The unpacked dex files will be located in 
/data/user/0/iv.va.exposed/virtual/user/0/{packagename} 
Notes: If the device is rooted, we can retrieve dex files using adb pull, if it is not 




Results: Apps that packed by Qihoo360, Baidu, Bangcle are unpacked successfully, 
apps packed from packers such as Legu, Ijiami cannot be unpacked or output empty 
dex files. 
Pros & cons 
 The good things about using VirtualExposed and FDex2 are, it can unpack from more 
packers since it directly hooks the getDex method instead of reading dex files from memory, 
as a lot of packers start to protect the memory during unpacking stage. In addition, because of 
the framework + module idea, we do not need to compile system, or root device, and if we 
want to modify or update the module for the latest Android version, we can just make the 
modifications on the module and packed as an Apk to test, which makes this method 




CHAPTER 8.    RECOVERY 
In order to verify the unpacked code is identical to the original code, and to support 
some dynamic experiments that our security group currently running, it is necessary to find a 
way to recover the unpacked dex files to a runnable Apk. Therefore, this chapter is going to 
introduce a working method that we have tried to perform a recovery (repack). 
In the following a few sections, we are going to conclude the general approach of 
recover an unpacked android app, and a practical experiment that successfully recovered an 
app that was packed by Qihoo360 and then unpacked by FDex2. 
General Steps 
1. Obtain dex files 
The first step is to unpack the original packed Apk with one of the unpacking 
tools that was introduced in the previous chapters and obtain the dex files as the 
output. We have to be careful about the output dex files as there might be 
irrelevant or useless dex files depending on different unpacking tools, a good 
approach to check is to search the dex files content by keywords such as the 
package name. 
2. Replace dex files 
Assume you are confident with the dex files, then the next step is to replace the 
dex files in the original packed Apk with the dex files that we obtained from the 
last step, and make sure the dex files are renamed identical to the original ones. 
3. Modify AndroidManifest.xml 
Since the new dex file that we obtained is the one with the shell application code 




AndroidnManifest.xml file such as replacing the application entry point name 
with the original Apk package name (not the packed package name), and remove 
some modules or attributes that are apparently used for shell application. This step 
requires users to have some knowledge of Android development, otherwise, it is 
difficult to tell which modules to keep or delete. 
4. Repack and sign the Apk 
There are a lot of tools such as Android Studio and Apktool to sign and pack the 
Apk, after it is packed successfully, it is ready for installing and testing. 
5. Test and debug 
If the recovered app is working perfectly after the last step, then this step can be 
skipped. If unfortunately, the recovered crashed in runtime, it is necessary to 
debug and repair the app. Most likely, the app is crashed due to some code of 
shell Apk has been deleted but the main activity is still calling some classes, 
functions or variables of shell Apk. Therefore, the best approach is to set 
breakpoints and go over the code in runtime to find out which line of code is 
causing problems. 
Experiment 
A useful tool that we found is an Android app named “MT Manager” (MT Manager, 
2019), it is a powerful file manager in Android platform, with this app, we can move files, 
rename files, searching keywords in files, we can even decompile dex files, make some 




are able to do the recovery within an Android device. In the next a few sections, we will 
show the experiment steps and details. 
Environment: 
The experiment is running on an Android emulator (Nox emulator) with MT Manager 
installed, a packed app (we used a simple log app that we need to perform other dynamic 
experiments) packed with Qihoo360, and dex files that are unpacked by FDex2 (the last 
approach of Chapter 7). 
Steps: 
1. Launch MT Manager 
2. Move dex files to /mnt/shared/Other/ 
3. Search each dex file by the target package name until finding the right dex file 
4. Rename the found dex file to “classes.dex” 
5. Open the original packed Apk and view contents 
6. Replace the “classes.dex” in original packed Apk with the one we renamed 
7. Open “AndroidManifest.xml” with decompiler 
a. Replace the <application … name = “{package_name}”/> 
b. Remove <meta-data … /> block 
c. Compile 
8. Sign the Apk by going to function -> Apk sign 
9. Install the signed Apk and run it 
Evaluation: 
 First of all, the recovered and the signed app is running successfully as the original 




one. In order to verify the identity, we performed a comparison between these two Apks. 
After decompiling these two Apks using JEB, we found the classes of these are the same, no 
added or resected classed found due to packing or unpacking. Furthermore, we performed a 
line-by-line code comparison using “file diff”, and the result shows that all the code files 
between two Apks are identical. 
Conclusion 
Overall, this recovery approach is successful and could be applied to our team’s other 
security experiment’s workflow if it involves a packed app. Also, this approach completes 
the entire unpacking process, from a packed app to a complete unpacked and re-signed app 






CHAPTER 9.    SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, three typical Android ransomware applications are analyzed and got 
resolved using reverse engineering approach and both statistic and dynamic methods. 
Although we cannot crack all the ransomware spreading in the Android market, it is time to 
stand out and fight back. We hope my work can improve the Android market environment a 
little bit, and we encourage everyone to refuse to pay any money for unlocking or decryption. 
Only in this way, the ransomware packaging business can be stopped.  
In addition to ransomware, we have performed a few experiments on the Android 
unpacking process, with principles, experiments steps explained in detail, and also discussed 
the pros and cons for each unpacker we tested. We also included recovery in the unpacking 
process to best support our team’s other security experiments. As a result, some of the tools 
that we have tested could be applied to our other researches workflow. 
In the future, we are going to analyze more complex Android ransomware, for those 
using remote unlocking, and SMS control unlocking. We are also planning to implement a 
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